A number of authors have argued that a worker's occupation of employment is at least as important as the worker's industry of employment in determining whether the worker will be hurt or helped by international trade. We investigate the role of occupational mobility on the e↵ects of trade shocks on wage inequality in a dynamic, structural econometric model of worker adjustment. Each worker in our specification can switch either industry, occupation, or both, paying a time-varying cost to do so in a rational-expectations optimizing environment. We find that the costs of switching industry and occupation are both high, and of similar magnitude, but in simulations we find that a worker's industry of employment is much more important than either the worker's occupation or skill class in determining whether or not she is harmed by a trade shock.
If this is right, it is important information for policymakers to have to be able to target compensation programs e↵ectively.
We take the focus on occupations in a new direction. Building on earlier work (Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) ) (henceforth ACM) in which we estimated the costs to workers of switching industries in a dynamic model in order to measure the welfare e↵ects of trade shocks on workers in di↵erent industries, we expand our framework to allow workers to change both their industry and their occupations, estimating the costs of doing so in an integrated dynamic structural econometric model. Our strategy is to specify a rational-expectations model in which industry and occupational switching is a forward-looking investment decision by long-lived workers; estimate the key structural parameters (particularly means and variances of moving costs) on worker data; and then simulate the e↵ects of trade shocks using these estimates to analyze welfare and the time-path of the labor market's adjustment.
This approach has a number of advantages. First, it allows us to incorporate a real dynamic analysis into the e↵ect on di↵erent occupations. Workers can and do change occupation, but it is costly to do so, and the degree of cost will a↵ect the wage e↵ects of a trade shock as well as how those wage changes translate into welfare changes. Importantly, a dynamic analysis allows us to identify the role of option value, which has been shown to have a large e↵ect on the welfare analysis of trade shocks (Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) ). If one's wage in one's own industry and occupation is reduced by a policy change, but wages in other occupations and industries to which one might consider switching are increased, then the positive option-value e↵ect brought about by the latter may dominate the negative direct e↵ect of the former. One needs a dynamic model with option value built in in order to find out what the net e↵ect is.
Second, we will argue that a full account of occupational choice can have a significant e↵ect on the whole pattern of gains and losses from trade shocks. Take a simple thought experiment as an example. Consider an economy with two goods and two types of worker, skilled and unskilled. Each good is produced by workers doing either of two tasks; output is a function of how many hours of each task are done, and the two goods di↵er in their task intensity. A worker's 'occupation' is defined by which task he or she performs. Consider three cases. Case 1. If skilled workers can all do task 1 but unskilled workers can do only task 2 and it is easy for a worker of either occupation to switch between industries, then this model is merely a thinly disguised Heckscher-Ohlin model, and standard Stolper-Samuleson results will obtain. If the country involved is skilled-labor abundant compared to the rest of the world, then trade opening will increase wage inequality. Further, to know whether a given worker gains or loses, all one needs to know is that worker's skill class. The occupation and industry of employment are superfluous.
Case 2. Now, suppose that a worker of either skill class can choose either occupation, and the choice is partly determined by idiosyncratic preferences; but once that choice has been made, it is very costly to switch to another occupation. At the same time, it is easy for a worker of either occupation to switch industries. In that case, there will be both skilled and unskilled workers in both occupations. Stolper-Samuelson logic will ensure that the occupation that is intensive in the import-competing industry will be made worse o↵ due to trade opening, while the other occupation will benefit. In this case, to know whether a given worker gains or loses, all one needs to know is that worker's occupation. The worker's skill class and industry of employment are superfluous.
Case 3. However, if either kind of worker can do either task with equal ease, and can switch between them readily, then skilled and unskilled workers will have the same wage, with or without trade, and so a trade shock will raise (or lower) all boats equally.
Clearly, even if all we are interested in is the e↵ect of trade on income inequality as between skilled and unskilled workers, the degree of occupational mobility has an enormous e↵ect.
To anticipate results, we find that both inter-sectoral and inter-occupational switching costs are large, and that they are similar in magnitude. Nonetheless, idiosyncratic shocks to the switching decision are also large, so that a non-negligible fraction of US workers switch along both dimensions every year. We also find that these costs are sub-additive, in the sense that the cost of switching both sector and occupation is much less than the cost of switching only industry plus the cost of switching only occupation. In addition, these costs are quite di↵erent in character for college-educated and non-college-educated workers. Finally, despite the extremely high costs of switching occupation, the main determinant of whether a worker benefits from trade liberalization or not is that worker's industry. In our simulations, one's occupation of employment makes almost no di↵erence to the direction of welfare e↵ect once industry has been taken into account.
Aside from our previous e↵orts in ACM, this equilibrium approach is related to some other work on the relationship between occupational choice and income distribution. Liu and Trefler (2011) use an equilibrium Roy-type model with endogenous matching of workers to occupations to interpret patterns of occupational adjustment in tradeable services occupations in response to international o↵shoring. They show that increased competition with foreign workers tends to lead to increased switching to lower-wage occupations for some workers and to higher-wage occupations for others. Crucially, if one allows for unobserved heterogeneity in worker productivity the welfare losses to a worker from a trade-induced downward occupational switch are greatly diminished. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) use a general-equilibrium model with optimal dynamic occupational choice to show that rises in the volatility of occupation-specific productivity can help explain increases in income inequality in the data.
In addition, we are adding to the developing literature on dynamic general-equilibrium adjustment to trade shocks. Cosar (2010) studies a model with costly adjustment due to search frictions, calibrated to Brazilian data. Dix-Carneiro (2011) estimates a structural model of dynamic labor-market response with costly adjustment and sector-specific human capital, again using Brazilian data. Each of these studies pursues similar themes but emphasizes di↵erent aspects of adjustment. In particular, our focus on occupational choice is complementary to the approaches of the other studies.
The next section lays out our model and estimation method. The following section shows the data and estimations, and the last section details the simulation results.
Model
We extend the model presented in ACM and Cameron Chaudhuri McLaren (2009) to include occupations along with sectors. Each worker chooses her sector i and occupation k jointly in each period in order to maximize her expected present discounted utility. Assume that there are I industries (sectors) and K occupations. There are two skill groups, indexed by s:
College-educated workers, indicated by s = c, and non-college educated workers, indicated by s = n. Assume that workers cannot change their skill status.
For the moment, we take wages as exogenously given, because it simplifies the discussion of the empirics. However, in Section 3 we will endogenize wages in each sector by specifying a spot market for labor in each sector that clears in each period (and of course the endogenous e↵ect of trade shocks on wages is a major focus of this inquiry). Each period t, the wage w iks t for each sector i, occupation k and skill class s is realized and observed by all. Each worker understands the distribution of future wages and optimizes accordingly.
In order to accommodate the fact that workers who appear identical to the econometrician often do di↵erent things, we introduce idiosyncratic shocks to workers' preferences. If worker n in skill class s spends period t working in occupation k in sector i, her instantaneous utility is w is a cell-specific iid utility shock with extreme value distribution with variance parameter ⌫ which are drawn separately by each worker in every period, 1 and
is an iid shock to the attractiveness of working in industry-occupation cell (i, k) that is common to all workers of skill class s. We will henceforth refer to these two shocks as the 'idiosyncratic shock' and the 'common shock,' respectively. We adopt the timing assumption that a worker in sector-occupation cell (i, k) at the beginning of period t enjoys wage w iks t and non-pecuniary benefit ⌘ iks t for sure, but will receive the idiosyncratic benefit ✏ nik t only if
she remains in that cell. If she switches to cell (j, l) during period t, then at the end of the period she will receive idiosyncratic benefit ✏ njl t instead.
We assume that a worker learns
0 , and then decides to move or stay, with moving cost C(i, k, j, l, s), where i and k are the worker's initial sector and occupation, and j and l are her final sector and occupation. If a worker does not change her sector or occupation then the moving cost is equal to zero, so C(i, k, i, k, s) = 0. In principle, we could assume a di↵erent value for the moving cost for each value of (i, j, k, l, s) and estimate each one, but this would make the model impossible to estimate. We will therefore need to parameterize the moving cost function somehow, and we will show later on how we do this.
1 More precisely, we set the parameters for this two-parameter family of distributions equal to ( ⌫, ⌫), which ensures a mean of zero and a variance equal to
. See Patel, Kapadia, and Owen (1976).
Equilibrium relationships.
The optimization problem for worker z can be summarized by the following Bellman equa-
is the ex post payo↵ to the worker in period t conditional on the realization of that period's shocks, and V iks t is the ex ante expected payo↵ to a worker, where the expectation is taken with respect to that period's shocks: the vector of idiosyncratic shocks, ✏ z t , and the common preference shock ⌘ iks t .
Taking expectations with respect to all shocks, this yields:
where ⌦ iks t is interpreted as an option-value term. In other words, the expected payo↵ to a worker in a given cell at a given date is equal to the current wage plus common non-pecuniary benefit, plus the continuation value if the worker stays in that cell next period, plus the value of the option of moving to another sector and/or occupation.
Due to the extreme value distribution of the ✏ t , it can be shown that workers' optimal choice of sector-occupation cell in each period will satisfy:
where m ikjls t denotes the fraction of workers of s type in sector-occupation cell (i, k) who choose to move to cell (j, l) in period t, which we will call the gross flow from that origin cell to that destination cell. This is the same as the functional form familiar from multinomial logit problems (a full algebraic derivation can be found in the appendix of Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) ). Essentially, (2) says that the more attractive (j, l) is expected to be in the future relative to other cells, and the lower is the cost of switching to it from (i, k), then the larger is the fraction of workers who will choose that location. Crucially, however, this response of the gross flow to the future relative attractiveness or current switching cost is determined by the parameter ⌫, which we may recall is proportional to the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks ✏ n t . A large value of ⌫ implies that idiosyncratic preference shocks tend to be large; in the limit, those shocks are all workers care about, and so workers will disregard relative future profitability in choosing their sectors and occupations. More generally, the m ikjls t will respond more to future expected wage di↵erentials the smaller is ⌫. This point will be useful in identifying ⌫ econometrically.
Econometric method.
The estimation method is described in detail with full derivations in Artuç (2012b) . We need to estimate the parameters of the moving costs, C ikjls t , as well as the idiosyncratic variance ⌫. In addition, we need to estimate the means⌘ iks of the common preference shocks ⌘ iks t . We do this in two stages, using the two equations discussed above, the gross-flows equation The first stage uses (2) with data on actual gross flows to estimate value di↵erences and the moving cost function normalized with ⌫. Equation (2) can be estimated using the following Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression equation
with destination fixed e↵ect jls t , origin fixed e↵ect ↵ iks t and bilateral resistance parameter 
This estimation can be done for each year of the data as a separate cross section.
These parameters for the first-stage regression can be identified from gross flows alone.
Consider, for example, a model with many cells, and suppose that at time t a large fraction of type-s workers in every other cell moves to cell (i, k) and a large fraction also move to cell i The second stage uses the di↵erence between (1) as written out for cell (i, k) and the same equation as written out for cell (j, l), multiplied by ⌫ :
In (5), all of the variables are either in the data (namely, the wages) or estimated from Roughly, the idea is as follows. Stage 1 uses the observed gross flows of workers to infer
of each sector/occupation cell at each date, which is a combination of the future relative profitability of each cell with the responsiveness ⌫ of workers to that 2 A key to the derivation is the fact that with the extreme-value distribution for the " t matrix,
future profitability; and (ii) the cost of switching. But that does not allow us to separate out the future relative profitability from the responsiveness. Having, then, a panel of such 'pull' estimates and the costs, we can put them together in Stage 2 with wages to see how much the 'pull' is a↵ected by changes in wage di↵erentials. This allows us to separate out the 'responsiveness' factor ⌫ and complete the estimation. Essentially, if gross flows do not respond very much to future wage di↵erentials, a low value of ⌫ will be indicated, otherwise a high value.
A qualification that should be noted is that in principle equation (5) can be used to estimate as well as ⌫, but in practice it turns out to be di cult to do so. The reason is that significant changes in induce only small changes in equilibrium aggregates. As a result, we impose a value of that seems reasonable based on the literature, and examine how robust results are to changes in its value.
2 Data and Regression Analysis 2.1 Sector and Occupation Categories. The only departure we make from the Census categories is to combine the last two categories into the 'laborer' occupation, since these two are quite small. In addition to sector and occupation, we group workers into two education groups, workers with no college education, workers with some college education.
The Switching-Cost Function.
We can now show how we implement the switching-cost function C t (i, k, j, l, s) empirically. In principle, we could assume a di↵erent value for the moving cost for each value of (i, j, k, l, s) and estimate each one, but this would create a vast number of parameters and make identification of those parameters impossible. Therefore, we need to parameterize the moving cost function somehow. We have attempted to build a specification that is rich but at the same time parsimonious, and have allowed for four types of e↵ect on switching cost that might or might not turn out to be important in the data. First, we allow for the possibility that some industries or occupations are harder to get into than others. This leads us to estimate an 'entry cost' for each sector and for each occupation. Second, we allow for the possibility that the cost of switching both sector and occupation is di↵erent from the sum of the cost of switching sector and the cost of switching occupations -that there may be some non-linearity in the cost of joint switching. Finally, we allow for the possibility of a pecking order in occupations such that it may be more costly to switch to occupation j from a lower-ranked occupation than from a higher-ranked occupation. To do this as simply as possible, we note that occupational categories 1 and 2 above are mainly o ce-type work while 3-5 are mainly not, and that the industries are ranked in inverse order of share of college-educated workers. We will call a switch from occupation 2 to 1 a movement upward within the o ce occupations; a movement from 5 to 3 or 4 or form 4 to 3 a movement upward within non-o ce occupations; and a movement from 3, 4, or 5 to 1 or 2 a movement into the o ce category. We will allow each of these three moves to generate an additional cost.
More precisely, we specify the function as follows:
where
, and C
4,s t
are parameters common to all workers. The interpretation is as follows. First, the value C 1,j,s t is the 'entry cost' mentioned above for switching sectors, and the cost indicated in line (7) applies when the worker switches sectors (i 6 = j)
but not occupations (k = l). The value C 2,l,s t is the corresponding 'entry cost' for switching occupations, and the cost indicated in line (8) applies when the worker switches occupation
Second, for each educational class s, the function C Third, we allow for the possibility that the cost of switching in one dimension is a↵ected by whether or not the worker is switching in the other dimension. For example, if a worker is switching sectors, that may raise the cost of also switching occupations, since there is a rising marginal cost of additional complexity in decision making; or it may lower the cost of switching occupations, since switching sectors already creates as much disruption in the worker's life as it is possible to create. In other words, we allow for the possibility that these switching costs are not simply additive. The parameter C 4,s t captures this in line (9) where both sector and occupation are changing (i 6 = j, k 6 = l), and could be positive (as in the first case just mentioned) or negative (as in the second). All of these parameters may di↵er by skill class s.
Descriptive Statistics.
We normalize annual real wages so that the average annual real wage across all workers in the sample is unity. Table 1 shows the distribution of normalized wages across occupations and sectors along with the number of observations for each type. The highest average wages are found in White-collar occupations, followed by the Tech/Sales category.
Rates of Mobility: Transition Matrices.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize occupational and sectoral mobility of the workers in our sample respectively, showing transition from row to column. The main diagonal of Table 2 shows the fraction of workers in each occupation who stay in that occupation each year, on average.
This varies from 95% for service occupations to 96.7% for craft occupations. Clearly, most workers do not switch industry in a given year, which is hardly surprising, but the fraction who do varies from 3.3% to 5% which is significant. In addition, note that the o↵-diagonal elements are all positive, ranging from the 0.5% of laborers who move to white-collar jobs each year (or white-collar to service) to the 2.1% of service workers who move to laborer occupations.
The distinction made above between o ce occupations and non-o ce occupations appears to be meaningful. All of the rates of flow between o ce categories (White collar and Tech/Sales) and between non-o ce categories (Service, Craft and Laborer) are, with one The matrix for sectoral mobility is similar. The rate of switching varies from 2.8% for manufacturing to 5.3% for agriculture and construction. The o↵-diagonal elements range from the 0.7% of manufacturing workers who switch to agriculture and construction each year to the 2.5% of non-traded services workers who switch to traded services each year.
The biggest inflows from any initial sector are into traded services. We are, of course, interested in joint mobility decisions, and so we need to think about the possibility that a worker will move along both dimensions at once. Table 4 shows how frequently this occurs compared to switching along only one dimension. For each of the twenty sector-occupation cells, the third column of the table shows the average fraction of workers who change sector but not occupation each year, the fourth column shows the fraction who change occupation but not sector, and the fifth column shows the fraction who change both. The fraction who change along both dimensions is consistently similar in magnitude to the number who change in either dimension alone. Indeed, for some cells sectoral switches alone are more frequent than occupational switches alone; for other cells the pattern is the reverse; but for most cells the frequency of switching along both dimensions is either between the frequency of switching only sector and the frequency of switching only occupation or -more often -higher than either. Put di↵erently, the probability that a worker switches sector is quite similar to the probability that a worker switches occupation, and a worker who switches in one dimension is at least as likely also to switch in the other dimension as not. This all suggests that the costs of switching along either dimension are likely quite similar, and the cost of switching both is likely not significantly greater than the cost of switching only one, which would imply a negative value of C 4,s . This is all borne out in the estimates, as will be seen shortly. In Table 5 , we present the ratio of industry-occupation cells for each industry and occu- The estimation results from the first stage are presented in Table 6 , and the results from the second stage are presented in Table 7 . Recalling that estimation in Stage 2 depends on , and that we are not estimating , the results in Table 7 are presented for an assumed value of = 0.97 and also for = 0.9. These two values bracket the great majority of discount factors used in the literature. For our purposes, the results are virtually identical (which underscores the di culty of estimating ). For simplicity, we will unless otherwise stated refer to the = 0.97 estimates.
The estimated moving costs are all quite large. For example, the ratio C 2js /⌫ corresponding to the cost of entering a white-collar occupation for a non-college educated worker is 5.24, which, given our estimate of 1 ⌫ as 3.89 (from Table 7 ) and hence ⌫ = 0.257 implies C 2js = 1.35. In other words, given our normalization of wages, the cost of entering a white-collar occupation for a non-college educated worker is something more than an average worker's annual income (ignoring for the moment the additional cost of 'pecking-order e↵ects' captured by C 3,k,l,s t in (8) above. These will be discussed below.). This should not be taken literally, but rather indicates that there are large frictions in the reallocation of labor that are picked up by the estimation -gross flows of workers do respond to future wage di↵erentials, but only weakly. At the same time, as indicated by the mobility matrix tables, a small but positive fraction of workers do switch both sector and occupation each year. This is possible within the model because of a large value of ⌫. The implied value of ⌫ = 0.257, given the extreme-value distribution, amounts to a standard deviation for ✏ nik t of 0.33. In other words, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic preference shock for nonpecuniary enjoyment of a given sector-occupation cell is one third of average annual income, indicating that occasionally, even with no di↵erences in wages across cells at all, a worker will be willing to incur a large cost in order to switch from the low-idiosyncratic-benefit cell to the high-benefit cell.
In interpreting results, it should be pointed out that the moving cost for any worker is actually C ikjls t + ✏ iks t ✏ jls t , the common moving cost plus the idiosyncratic part. As a result, for workers who actually move, the cost incurred will generally be less than C ikjls , since it is workers with low idiosyncratic costs who will chose to move.
At the same time, note that the cost of entering white-collar occupations for a college- The costs of switching sectors are similar in magnitude to the costs of switching occupation, but unlike for occupations, the patterns of costs are quite similar for the two educational groups. For both, it is much easier to move into the traded services sector than the manufacturing sector, for example.
Clearly, these estimates do not imply any tendency for wages to be equated across sectors or occupations, either in the short run or in the long run. A worker chasing high wages would need to see a very substantial wage di↵erence, expected to persist quite a long time, in order to justify incurring switching costs of the magnitude observed here. In addition, the high variance of the idiosyncratic shocks, as measured by ⌫, suggests that workers behave as if they take factors other than wages into account in their career decisions. This is true despite the fact that workers are quite mobile in the sense that there are always workers switching sector and occupation, as shown in Tables 2 to 4 . This feature of this sort of model is discussed at some length in Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2008) .
Importantly, note that the last row of Table 6 shows a value for C 4 that is always negative, with a value around 4. This means that the cost of switching both sector and occupation is roughly the same as switching either sector or occupation, which is consistent with the patterns noted in Table 4 .
'Pecking-order e↵ects' are captured by the last three rows of each panel of Table 6 . Clearly the costs up moving up the occupation ladder within the o ce-job category and within the non-o ce category are both essentially zero and statistically insignificant. There is weak evidence for a cost of switching from the non-o ce category to the o ce category, but the magnitude of the coe cient is small and it is not statistically significant.
Note that although the entry costs we have estimated are sizable, they are an order of magnitude smaller than estimates obtained with a similar model in ACM. The main reason is that here we have allowed for the sector-occupation aggregate preference shocks ⌘ iks t , which were absent in ACM. They are not of independent interest, but their estimated values are presented in Table 7 .
Simulations
We can now turn to simulation of a trade liberalization. For this, we need to complete the general-equilibrium model and calibrate it. We specify production functions for each sector below, and assume a spot market for labor in each sector that clears each period given the number of workers in each cell as of the beginning of the period. We will also specify trade policy that determines the prices of all tradeable goods for each date, and assume that all workers know that sequence. In addition, for this exercise, we suppress the shocks (⌘ iks t ) to preferences (see (1)), since they are a distraction from our interest in the e↵ects of a trade shock. We also take the mean value of the parameters (C We assume Cobb-Douglas production functions for each sector i:
where q i t is the value of output, L i,k t is the e↵ective human capital in sector i and occupation k, which is the human-capital-adjusted sum of number of college graduates and non-college graduates:
. 5 We do not require the ↵ ik weights in (10) to sum to unity for any sector, in order to allow for sector-specific capital, which is absorbed by the A Table 8 . Note that, 5 We examined a more flexible CES within-occupation aggregation of the two types of labor, but our estimates of the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor within occupations produced very high values, 60 and above. Perfect substitutability within each industry-occupation cell seems like a good approximation. Please note that this is di↵erent from the elasticity of substitution between high-and lowskilled workers examined by other authors in models without occupations, such as Ottaviano and Peri (2012 ,  Table 5 ), for example. Their estimates of the elasticity of substitution between high-and low-skilled labor take a value around 2, but since generally high-and low-skilled workers have di↵erent mixes of occupations, this should be thought of as picking up substitutability across occupations as well as across educational classes.
consistent with the patterns observed in Table 5 , the Traded and Non-traded Services sectors are the most White-collar intensive (as indicated by their high values of ↵ 1 in Table 8), and Manufacturing is the most Laborer intensive (as indicated by its high value of ↵ 5 ). We treat manufacturing and traded services as goods whose prices are determined on world markets, while the other two sectors produce non-traded output whose prices adjust to clear the domestic market. Our simulation is not intended to reproduce the historical data in detail, but to provide an example of a liberalization that produces changes in trade volumes roughly of the same order of magnitude as what has been experienced in the period of the data. With that in mind, the liberalization experiment is set up as follows. The world prices of manufactures and traded services are 0.85 and 1 respectively. Initially, there is a 30% tari↵ on manufactures, so the domestic price is 1.15, and this is expected by all to continue permanently. From that initial steady state, suddenly at t = 0 the tari↵ is eliminated, and is expected to stay at zero permanently. Since at date t = 0 no labor reallocation has yet had a chance to occur, the marginal products of labor are unchanged and so the percentage change in real wages is exactly the percentage change in each sector's relative price. Manufacturing wages fall by 17%, while real wages in tradeable service rise due to the drop in CPI, by We present some key statistics from the simulation in Table 9 and Table 11 for the case = 0.97 and in Table 10 and Table 12 for the case = 0.9. Tables 9 and 10 show the impact e↵ect of the liberalization on wages and welfare for each group at date 0, while Tables 11 and   12 show the long-run e↵ect, meaning the comparison of the new steady state with the old one. The three boxes of Table 9 and 10 show, respectively, the date-0 percentage change in wage, percentage change in welfare for non-college-educated workers, and percentage change in welfare for college-educated workers for each sector-occupation cell, for the two values of . Tables 11 and 12 follow the same format but for steady-state changes. The welfare changes in Tables 9 and 10 are the most relevant for our purposes because they measure the change in expected discounted lifetime utility starting from the moment of the policy change into the infinite future, and thus take full account of the transition to the new steady state.
Note that, for both values of , wages for all occupations in manufacturing drop at date 0 (by exactly the drop in the relative price of manufacturing output, 17%), while real wages for all occupations not in manufacturing rise at date 0 (benefitting from the reduction in the consumer price of manufactured output). However, over time workers of all occupations leave manufacturing and wages there rise, so that in the long run manufacturing wages for all occupations are slightly higher than their original values (first box of Tables 11 and 12 ).
At the same time, workers enter the other sectors, especially traded services, pushing down the marginal products of labor there, and also pushing down the prices of non-traded sector output. Therefore, wages in sectors other than manufacturing fall gradually after date 0, coming to rest just slightly above their old steady-state value (for both values of , the smallest steady-state wage increase found in manufacturing (0.89% for white-collar workers with = 0.97 and 0.75% for service workers with = 0.9 respectively), and the largest is for service workers in the traded-services sector (2.85% and 3.00% respectively)). Across the board, the smallest long-run real wage increase is for workers in manufacturing, not surprising since that is the industry hit by the liberalization and the industry that su↵ers large initial wage losses at the date of the policy change.
The question that has animated this paper is the welfare question: Who benefits from the trade liberalization? For manufacturing workers, the liberalization sharply reduces their wages in the short run, very modestly increasing them in the long run. In addition, it raises the wages of workers in all other sectors in both the short and the long run. This is important for each manufacturing worker, because in each period there is a chance that she will choose to switch to those sectors. As a result, the current wage for a manufacturingsector worker is reduced, but her option value is improved -recall the ⌦ iks t term in equation (1) . Whether the manufacturing worker benefits from the liberalization or not depends on the balance between these two e↵ects. The last two boxes of Table 10 show that if workers are relatively impatient ( = 0.9), the short-run manufacturing wage e↵ect dominates, and welfare is lowered for manufacturing workers, in all occupations, by something between 0% and 2%. The last two boxes of Table 9 show that with more patient workers ( = 0.97) the two e↵ects roughly cancel each other out; the net welfare e↵ect on workers is positive more often than negative, but less than 1% in magnitude for each occupation and educational class. For workers in all other sectors, the welfare e↵ect of the liberalization is positive and of significant magnitude for all occupations, ranging from approximately one percent to approximately four percent.
In other words, with a low discount factor, workers in the manufacturing sector su↵er harm from the liberalization, regardless of occupation; while with a high discount factor, workers in the manufacturing sector enjoy a modest benefit from the liberalization, regardless of occupation. For either discount factor, workers in all other sectors enjoy a significant welfare improvement from the liberalization, regardless of occupation. This speaks to the question raised in the introduction: Is a worker's occupation more or less important than the worker's industry for determining whether or not she gains from a trade liberalization?
Despite the high costs of switching occupations, these results suggest that for the most part it is still what industry the worker is in and not what occupation she works in that is key.
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It should also be underlined that these results underscore the importance of a dynamic approach. A reduced-form regression that identified the short-run e↵ect on wages, such as is recorded in the first box of Tables 9 and 10 , would be a very misleading indicator of welfare, as indicated in the bottom two boxes. The e↵ects on welfare are much smaller, and -depending on the discount factor -can also be in the opposite direction than the short-run wage e↵ect. 
